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Abstract This paper describes the efficiency of Dutch
hospitals using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
method with bootstrapping. In particular, the analysis focuses
on accounting for cost inefficiency measures on the part of
hospital corporate governance. We use bootstrap techniques,
as introduced by Simar and Wilson (J. Econom. 136(1):31–
64, 2007), in order to obtain more efficient estimates of the
effects of governance on the efficiency. The results show
that part of the cost efficiency can be explained with
governance. In particular we find that a higher remuneration
of the board as well as a higher remuneration of the
supervisory board does not implicate better performance.
Keywords DEA.Bootstrapping.Hospitals.Governance
Introduction
Developments in health care policy in western countries
during the last two decades have been characterised by
liberalising markets, financial reforms and deregulation.
Many health care systems are being transformed from
centrally governed systems into regulated competitive
markets (see e.g. [7, 16, 18, 24, 30]). Although there is a
large variety of systems from country to country, there are
some common characteristics. Generally, there has been a
shift in competencies from ministries and central authorities
to health care suppliers and insurers with regard to service
price setting, capacity planning, investments, business
conduct, strategic decisions and property rights. The impact
of these changes has been analysed extensively. Most of
this research is focused on issues concerning the relation
between the characteristics of suppliers, on the one hand,
(issues such as scale, scope, property rights and market
concentration) and efficiency and quality on the other hand.
The policy reforms were, however, accompanied by
substantial change to the way suppliers were managed and
controlled. Whereas previously a single, uniform manage-
ment and control model was used, now a variety of models
have been established. Large variations were developed in
the size of the management board, the size of the
supervisory boards, the remuneration of board members,
the intensity of the supervisory board’s control, the
application of integrity codes and the transparency of
decision-making. So far researchers have not paid much
attention to these aspects of management and control,
which can be summarised in the term ‘corporate gover-
nance’, or to their quantitative effects on productivity and
efficiency. Although literature on this issue is scarce, some
interesting approaches can be found (see e.g. [1, 6, 8, 9,
12]). This article therefore focuses on the relationship
between corporate governance and efficiency.
An interesting case is the Dutch hospital industry, where
the corporate governance is embedded in a governance
code. A governance code provides guidelines for good
governance, adequate supervision, accountability and justi-
fication and is an instrument for self-regulation. The urge to
have guidelines for good governance has arisen as there is
less supervision from the government. A governance code
fills the gap of deregulation. The practice of governance
codes in the Dutch hospital industry started a decade ago.
In 1999 the Health Care Governance commission published
recommendations and guidelines for good governance. The
recommendations gave momentum to the debate over good
governance and supervision. This resulted in several
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This situation lasted until 2005, when a single governance
code was developed for almost the entire health care
system. The academic hospitals, due to regulation, have
their own specific governance code.
Summarizing, most of the research on the impact of
health care reforms directly focuses on the relationships
between the main aspects of reform, such as non-regulated
prices, free market entry and competition, and on the
efficiency of health care providers. No attention is paid to
more indirect effects through changes in corporate gover-
nance due to the reform. To our knowledge no research has
been carried out yet on the effects of corporate governance
structures on efficiency in a health care industry. Since large
variation exists in corporate governance structures and
relevant data are available, the Dutch hospital industry
provides a unique case to establish this type of relationships.
In this paper we quantify the effects of corporate
governance structure on efficiency of Dutch hospitals. To
do so, we apply Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to
derive cost-efficiency scores and follow up by a second
stage of the analysis. Bootstrapping techniques are applied
to deal with consistency and bias-correction (see [28]). The
effect (if any) of corporate governance structure factors on
the cost-efficiency scores is identified. We apply this
approach to a set of Dutch hospital data since we wish to
provide Dutch hospitals with relevant information on
establishing productive corporate governance structures.
Earlier work on the efficiency of Dutch hospitals can be
found in Blank and Valdmanis (see [3]), Blank and van
Hulst [5] and Blank and Merkies [4].
A two-stage analysis that assesses the impact of
explanatory factors on efficiency scores derived using data
envelopment analysis (DEA) has garnered attention in the
literature. Whereas some have used Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), Tobit analysis has been the most popular analytical
method. In this method the output-based or the reciprocal of
the input-based efficiency score is regressed on a variety of
variables thought to affect efficiency (see e.g. [17]). Simar
and Wilson [28] challenge this approach by demonstrating
that in the second stage:
& Serial correlation arises and explanatory variables are
correlated with error terms, which disappear at a slow
rate of convergence;
& The efficiency score, which is the dependent variable in
the second stage, has a bias.
As an alternative to simply using the efficiency measure as
a discrete point with a bias, Simar and Wilson [28]a d v o c a t e
the use of bootstrapping techniques in order to obtain
unbiased and consistent estimates. Various studies have
recently applied interesting applications of the Simar and
Wilson technique to hospital data (see e.g. [21, 22, 29]).
The outline of this paper is as follows: “Economic theory
on corporate governance” describes economic theory on
corporate governance; in “Model and method” we define
the DEA model and the bootstrapping procedure; in “Data”
the available data is described; in “Empirical results” we
present the empirical results and conclude the paper in
“Conclusions”.
Economic theory on corporate governance
There is no general economic framework for evaluating
corporate governance structure and the efficiency of
business entities. Some elements refer directly to the
principal agent problem, which reflect the differing goals
of various stakeholders. Government wants to maximise
public values, whereas members of the management board
or the supervisory board strive to maximise individual
goals, such as remuneration or status. In the case of
hospitals, patients want to maximise accessibility and
quality of care. The extent to which each stakeholder
succeeds in achieving these goals strongly depends on their
relative position with regard to information, market power,
and the instruments available to influence the outcomes of
the business process (institutional context). It also depends
on the personal characteristics of stakeholders (quality,
experience and ethics). Consequently, theory on corporate
governance includes aspects of agency theory, production
theory, industrial economics and institutional economics.
With particular respect to agency theory, Bozec and Dia [6]
present an interesting overview.
We present a rather heuristic theoretical approach in
discussing various characteristics of corporate governance
structure. We distinguish four major clusters of character-
istics: the management board, the supervisory board, the
external stakeholders and a cluster of institutional relation-
ships between various stakeholders.
Management board
The management board can be regarded as a resource in the
production process. Due to the production structure, size
and quality should be in accordance with the level and
composition of the services and goods provided. Deviations
from the optimal level of management are considered to be
allocative efficiencies. For example, Rodríguez-Álvarez and
Lovell [23] present an application to the Spanish public
hospital sector and observe persistent allocative inefficiency
in variable inputs and overcapitalisation in these hospitals.
A focus on the continuing improvement of employee skills
through training and education is also seen as part of the
quality of management (see e.g. [1]). Evidence for the
hypothesis that board size and efficiency are negatively
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Yermack [32]. The size of the board can be measured as
the number of board members, whereas quality can be
measured by the members’ level of education, the number
of years of board experience and the number of new board
members. The composition of the board in terms of
profession (e.g. economist, lawyer or doctor) may also
reflect management board quality. A rather indirect measure
of quality is remuneration.
Supervisory board
The supervisory board’s main assignment is to act as a
countervailing power to the management board. The
supervisory board audits and advises the management
board. Based on legislative instruments they approve the
annual accounts and budgets, monitor the integrity of the
hospital and have a say in strategic decisions (such as
mergers). Their activities can also be regarded as part of a
production process, in which resources are transformed into
a number of audits, checks and advice. The size of the
board and the quality of its members are therefore relevant
characteristics. One should bear in mind that board
members may also have personal preferences that conflict
with public goals. Personal characteristics of the board may
therefore also reflect the ability to accomplish these
personal preferences. To accurately reflect the supervisory
board’s size and quality, the same type of variables used for
the management board should be included.
Other stakeholders
Other stakeholders include the central government, insur-
ance companies and patients. It is obvious that central and
local governments dictate the regulatory environment,
which consequently determines the playing field for
commercial enterprises. Issues such as capacity planning,
price setting, budget allocation, profit/not-for-profit and so
forth also affect the corporate governance structure.
Interesting examples of research on the effects of ownership
and profit/not-for-profit entities on efficiency can be found
in Diboky and Ubl [8] (also with bootstrapping techniques)
and Mutter and Rosko [19] (US hospitals). Since these
issues are not a part of our research, we will exclude them
from further discussion.
Since insurance companies are hospitals’ major clients
they have a certain influence on the corporate governance
structure. The way in which insurance companies are able
to use their influence, and the degree to which they do,
differs not only according to the regulatory environment but
can also differ across organisations: compare, for instance,
a HMO and a for-profit hospital. In the Dutch case insurance
companies and hospitals are strictly independent, however
through their regional market power insurance companies
have informal influence on corporate governance.
The role of patients in the corporate governance structure
will be expressed in the way patients are able to affect
business conduct. Some firms, for instance, provide client
(patient) representation on a statutory basis.
Multi-actor dependencies
Multi-actor dependencies refer to the formal and informal
relationships between various actors. The relationship be-
tweenthemanagementboardandthesupervisoryboardisone
example. We can distinguish two types of relation; first the
management board with final responsibility and second the
supervisory board or management subordinated by a board of
governors of thefoundation. Incase of a supervisoryboard the
management board has a maximum of competence power and
will be executive. In case of a board of governors the board of
governors has less competence power and will determine the
policy, management has the role of the executive.
Another relevant factor is board independence. Outside
managers are supposed to fulfil their monitoring function
better than executive managers because they are concerned
about their reputation (see e.g. [14]). Baysinger and
Hoskisson [2], on the other hand, claim that inside
managers have inside information and are therefore in a
better position to evaluate business conduct and perfor-
mance. Another aspect affecting boards is internal relations:
a board might have a chairperson but it is also possible to
have a collegial board. Finally the members of the board
can be either internal, in case they are employees of the
hospital, or external, i.e. an external interim manager.
Model and method
As mentioned in the introduction, we have applied a two-
stage estimation procedure with bootstrapping to investigate
the effect of governance variables on hospital performance.
We followed the methodology indicated as algorithm 1 in
Simar and Wilson ([28, page 41–42]), the methodology of
algorithm 1 is described in this chapter. The first stage of
theprocedureistoestimatethecostefficiencyofhospitals.The
second stage consists of explaining cost efficiency with
governance variables. In the second stage a bootstrap
procedure is applied. The second stage bootstrap procedure
leadstomoreaccurateestimatorsfortheexplanatoryvariables.
In the first step of our analysis, we conducted standard
cost efficiency DEA as described by Färe et al. [15], for on
overview of DEA literature see [13] .S i n c ew eh a v e
information on input prices for our sample of Dutch
hospitals, we used the cost-efficiency model rather than
the technical-efficiency DEA model that does not require
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cost efficiency of hospital ‘A’ equals the ratio of minimum
cost to actual cost. In other words, we gauge the minimum
expenditure required to produce service levels given
resource prices. The actual cost efficiency measure (CE)
is derived by the radial distance between the observed
hospital’s resources-services correspondence to the ‘best
practice’ frontier. This best practice frontier is constructed
by the linear combination of hospitals producing the same
levels of services as hospital A but at a lower level of cost.
The mathematical formulation is:
CE ¼ min
z;x
w Ax A
w Ax
subject to
P
j
z jyj   y A
P
j
z jx j   xA
zj   0
and
P
j
z j ¼ 1 in case of VRS ðÞ
ð1Þ
CE cost efficiency
w
A vector of resource prices of hospital A
x
A vector of resources of hospital A
y
A vector of services of hospital A
x best practice vector of resources
z vector of weights
The model described here assumes constant returns to
scale (CRS). CRS has been justified as long-term equilib-
rium, since a hospital can adjust its size over time.
However, it makes sense to correlate some of the explana-
tory variables with the size of the hospital, e.g. remuneration
of the board and size of the board. If we assume CRS, this
could lead to conclusions about the governance variables,
which are ambiguous. This is because the estimated
parameters also tell us something about the relation between
size and efficiency and whether the assumption of CRS is
valid. Variable returns to scale (VRS) deals with scale
effects. In general it is easier to be cost efficient under VRS
then under CRS. Instead of choosing between CRS and VRS
we applied both and discussed the results (e.g. [31]). In the
model VRS means that we have to add the restriction that
the sum of z
j equals one.
After solving for the cost-efficiency scores for hospitals
in our data set, we regressed the reciprocal of the cost-
efficiency scores on a set of explanatory variables. Our
cost-efficiency scores are obtained as results which theo-
retically ranges from zero to one, so the reciprocal varies
from one to infinity. We do so because we want to apply a
truncated regression. A higher reciprocal therefore implies
greater cost inefficiencies. The (explanatory) variables
account for the governance variables for each hospital.
The regression equation is given by:
d ¼ b0 þ
X
k
bkQk þ e   1 ð2Þ
δ reciprocal of the cost efficiency score
Qk k-th environmental feature
bk parameters to be estimated
e error term
However, note that δ is unobserved and is replaced by
the estimates ^ d. So the actual equation is given by:
^ d ¼ b0 þ
X
k
bkQk þ "   1 ð3Þ
There are several methods to estimate (3), including
OLS, Tobit analysis and truncated regression. However
Simar and Wilson [28] show that there are some issues in
estimating Eq. 3. First, the estimates of the cost-efficiency
scores have bias. Second, because the cost-efficiency scores
measured by the DEA approach are measured non-
parametrically, there is no error term associated with the
measure which when used as a dependent variable in the
second stage analysis could lead to inconsistent estimators.
To address the bias of ^ d we begin by specifying the
equation given in (3):
^ d ¼ Eð^ dÞþu ð4Þ
with E(u)=0. The bias of the estimator ^ d is defined by:
biasð^ dÞ Eð^ dÞ d ð5Þ
Substituting (2) and (4) and rearranging terms yields:
^ d   biasð^ dÞ u ¼ b0 þ
X
k
bkQk þ e   1 ð6Þ
Even though the u’s have a zero mean, the term biasð^ dÞ
does not, it is always strictly negative in finite samples.
Although the u’s are unknown and cannot be estimated, the
bias term can be estimated by bootstrap methods (for a
detailed discussion of the bootstrapping approach, see
Efron and Tibshirani [10] and Simar and Wilson [27]).
The bootstrap estimates of the bias can be used to obtain a
bias-corrected estimator of δ:
^ ^ d ¼ ^ d þ bi^ as ^ d
  
ð7Þ
Next we address the consistency of the estimators. As
we have already noted δ is unobserved and is replaced by
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^ d depends on all the observations of (w
A x
A,y
A),
Furthermore, the explanatory variables are correlated with
^ d, otherwise there would be no reason for a second stage.
Asymptomatically the serial correlation and the correlation
between explanatory variables and error terms disappears,
but at a slow rate. This means that a maximum likelihood of
β is consistent, however the usual parametric rate of
convergence (1/√n) does not apply. Therefore using a
bootstrap procedure in the second stage may be more
appropriate than a simple multiple regression approach
since a benefit of bootstrapping is that it leads to consistent
estimates of βk.
We next describe the bootstrapping procedure used in
this paper. We use the algorithm indicated as algorithm 1 in
Simar and Wilson [28]. Basically, the algorithm consists of
a procedure in which estimates of δ are obtained and a
bootstrap procedure in which estimates of bk are obtained
through truncated regression:
1. Compute the DEA scores using (1) to obtain ^ di.
2. Use maximum likelihood to obtain estimates ^ bk and ^ se
for the truncated regression of the efficiency scores on
the governance variables using (3), use only the
observation for which ^ d >1.
3. Apply the next three steps L times to obtain a set of
bootstrap estimates fð^ b»; ^ se
»Þbg
L
b¼1.
3.1 For each draw i=1,..,n draw ei from the
N 0; ^ s"
  
distribution with left truncation at
1   ^ b0  
P
k
^ bkzk.
3.2 For each i=1,.., n compute d
»
i ¼ ^ b0 þ
P
k
^ bkzk þei.
3.3 Use maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated
regression of d
»
i on the zk’s yielding estimates
ð^ b
»
; ^ s
»
eÞ.
4. Use the bootstrap values as described by Simar and
Wilson [28] and the original parameter estimates to
construct estimated confidence intervals for each
element as follows: If the distribution of ð^ bj   bjÞ were
known, the confidence interval follows from finding
values aa and ba such that:
Pr  ba   ^ bj   bjÞ   aa
 i
¼ 1   a
h
ð8Þ
for small values of α>0. However, the distribution is
unknown and therefore we use the j-th element of each
bootstrap value instead to find values a
»
a and b
»
a such that:
Pr  b
»
a   ^ b
»
j   bjÞ   a
»
a
 i
  1   a
h
ð9Þ
Finding a
»
a and b
»
a involves sorting the values ^ b
»
j   bjÞ
 
in increasing order and then deleting a
2   100
  
percent of
the elements at either end of the sorted list. After the sorted
list is determined we set  a
»
a and  b
»
a equal to the endpoints
of the truncated, sorted array. The estimated (1−α) percent
confidence interval is then given by:
^ bj þ a
»
a; ^ bj þ b
»
a 
h
ð10Þ
Note that in the procedure the parameters are boot-
strapped. It is also possible to bootstrap the DEA-scores
direct [25, 26], our focus is however on the parameters
Data
General
In this study, we used hospital data for the year 2007. Our
data comes from two sources. First of all detailed
information on input and outputs were obtained from the
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and were collected
by the Institute for Health Care Management using
numerous surveys, such as financial, patient and personnel
surveys. Secondly, for the data on governance, we used
data from the annual reports for hospitals. The annual
reports are compulsory and are systematically collected by
the Central Information point Healthcare Professions
(CIBG). The collected data is free obtainable in a practical
digital dataset. The dataset with inputs and outputs is
merged with a dataset with governance variables. For the
purposes of this study, observations on hospitals with
missing or unreliable data and academic hospitals were
excluded from the dataset. Academic (7) hospitals have a
very different cost structure due to their teaching and
research activities such that comparing them to general
hospitals is unreliable. Our final dataset contains 75
observations. Since there were 86 hospitals in 2007 in the
Netherlands, 11 hospitals are excluded. This was due to
missing data, unreliable data or in one case the hospital was
excluded because it is a military hospital.
Inputs and outputs
Since the main objective of hospitals is patient care, we
define the services of hospitals as the number of first-time
visits (i.e. the number of patients treated by physicians
without an admission) and the number of discharges.
Discharges have been separated into medical specialties in
order to capture case-mix differences. The dataset distin-
guishes over 30 specialties, so for computational ease, we
aggregated these medical specialties into three categories
on the basis of average length of stay (LOS) of a specialty
and whether or not patients had surgery. Our first group of
patients were treated by a doctor in a specialty with a LOS
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patients were treated by a specialty with an above-average
LOS. The distinction between the second and third group
is whether the patient was treated by a surgical specialty
or not.
Inputs include staff and administrative personnel,
nursing personnel, paramedical personnel (such as lab
technicians), other personnel (including maintenance,
security and cleaning), and material supplies. Material
supplies include medical supplies, food and heating.
Personnel and material supplies are treated as variable
resources since the hospital can change these in the short
term. Regarding personnel we have data on the volume
in terms of fulltime equivalents as well as salary costs,
input prices are obtained by dividing costs and volume.
It is possible to distinguish several inputs, but as we
apply DEA we wish to reduce the number of variables.
Because our focus is not really on allocation of inputs in
the model we reduced the number of variables by aggre-
gating the inputs. Descriptive statistics of the variables are
given in Table 1.
Governance variables
We have information about several variables that provide
information on governance; information on governance is
publically available through the annual accounts, which are
compulsory for hospitals. “Economic theory on corporate
governance” distinguishes three major clusters of character-
istics, with variables that provide information about the
management board, the supervisory board and a third set of
variables that refers to external stakeholders. Information
about the management board includes:
& the size of the board, measured with two dummy
variables. One dummy for two members and one
dummy for three or more members, which leaves one
member as the reference group (constant term);
& remuneration of board members. Since not all members
receive the same remuneration, for practical reasons we
have taken the remuneration figure for the chairperson;
& the type of contract (internal or external, with external
referring in most cases to interim management).
For the supervisory board our information includes:
& remuneration of board members. For practical reasons we
have taken the remuneration figure for the chairperson;
Multi-actor dependencies:
& statutory changes, measured by a dummy variable if
statutory changes took place in 2007. Statutory changes
refer to a change of the legal form, a change in the way care
is organized or a change in the competence of the internal
organs.
There are some other interesting governance variables
available, such as whether the board has a chairperson or
the type of administration. However, they are not usable
due to a lack of variation across hospitals. For instance, all
general hospitals used the same particular governance code
in 2007. Some other variables were tested but did not lead
to significant results, i.e. number of members that left the
board and the size of the supervisory board.
Mean Std deviation Minimum Maximum
Output
Discharges group 1 13.088 7.403 1.754 36.094
Discharges group 2 12.741 6.591 2.152 32.048
Discharges group 3 7.066 3.311 1.344 17.469
First-time visits 69.146 31.544 18.429 152.017
Input prices (in euro)
Staff and administrative personnel 44.730 4.346 32.907 62.493
Nursing personnel 47.606 3.120 39.367 58.872
Paramedical personnel 111.684 36.368 54.524 249.741
Other personnel 34.191 4.186 10.220 44.695
Inputs (×1000 euro)
Staff and administrative personnel 11.090 7.050 1.566 30.093
Nursing personnel 37.789 21.683 9.474 109.699
Paramedical personnel 8.229 7.174 0 45.876
Other personnel 7.449 4.183 90 20.053
Material supplies 38.267 23.666 8.823 111.894
Variable cost (×1000 euro.) 102.824 60.879 25.978 290.839
Table 1 Descriptive statistics,
Dutch General Hospitals 2007
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Empirical results
For the empirical results we used FEAR (DEA results) and
TSP (truncated regressions and bootstrap procedure), the
DEA results were also checked with Onfront. The first step
of the algorithm results in DEA-scores, Table 3 presents the
statistics of the DEA-scores. The table contains the results
for CRS as well VRS. The lowest score is one, representing
the hospitals that are efficient.
Under the CRS assumption the average efficiency is
1.28, the maximum ranges up to 2.12. Under the VRS
assumption the average is 1.12 while the maximum is 1.82.
These outcomes are very common. Ozcan [20] summarizes
the efficiency scores of a number of hospital studies. Most
of these studies report scores near 90% (meaning the
reciprocal is 1.11), depending on the DEA-variant chosen,
the distinct services and resources and sample. Also note
that the scores under VRS are lower then CRS, this is due
to the fact that scale effects are absorbed under VRS.
The efficiency scores provide an overview of the general
cost efficiency in the Dutch hospital sample. The variability
of performance can be explained by differences in
governance. Hence we continue with regressing the
efficiency score on the governance variables using the
algorithm as discussed in “Model and method”. Recall that
we use a bootstrap procedure to generate the results,
therefore we have no point estimates of the parameters.
Our results are presented as the lower and upper bound of a
95% confidence interval of the estimates. Table 4 presents
the results of the second stage bootstrap estimates.
The results can be interpreted as follows. A positive sign
means that the variable does not lead to better performance
in terms of cost efficiency; likewise a negative sign means
that the variable indicates better performance in terms of
cost efficiency. Furthermore we included the confidence
intervals. A long confidence interval means that there is
more uncertainty about the actual value of the parameter. If
the borders of a confidence interval have opposite signs, it
means we are not sure if there is an interrelationship
between the variable and better performance in terms of
cost efficiency.
From our modeling, we find some interesting differences
between the results under CRS and VRS. While under CRS
and VRS we find several parameters to be significant at
the 5% level, the significant parameters are not always the
same parameters. In fact only the remuneration of the
supervisory board is significant under both assumptions.
Some of the explanatory variables under CRS are not
merely a measure for governance but also a measure of
scale. On the other hand if we are less restrictive with our
level of significance we get more significant parameters
under VRS. For example if the confidence interval is 90%
instead of 95% the remuneration of the board, extern board
members and statutory changes are also significant under
VRS.
Under CRS we find that remuneration of the board and
the size of the board are significant with a positive sign.
This is partly so because of the earlier mentioned
correlation with the size of the hospital for these variables.
However, if we are less strict with the level of significance
we find that remuneration of the board is also significant
under the VRS assumption. A higher remuneration of the
board does not lead to better performance in terms of cost
efficiency. One can suggest all kinds of explanation for this
Mean Std deviation Minimum Maximum
Included in analyses
Dummy, size of the board = 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
Dummy, size of the board = 2 0.56 0.50 0 1
Dummy, size of the board =>3 0.16 0.37 0 1
Remuneration chairperson of the board 243.127 94.063 65.934 644.778
Dummy, external contract (int. man.) 0.16 0.37 0 1
Remuneration chairperson supervisory board 8.341 3.965 2.500 24.000
Dummy, statutory changes 0.49 0.50 0 1
Excluded from analyses
Average number of years members of the board 4.1 4.3 0 25.0
Dummy, member leaving the board 0.52 0.78 0 4
The size of the supervisory board 6.7 1.7 4.0 12.0
Independence of the supervisory board 0.27 0.45 0 1
Statutory provision of client representatives 0.11 0.31 0 1
Use of NVZD-code for remuneration 0.79 0.41 0 1
Table 2 Descriptive statistics,
Governance variables Dutch
General Hospitals 2007
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the lack of performance is indentified and expensive
management is hired to get back on track.
The remuneration of the supervisory board is significant
with a positive sign under both CRS and VRS. This means
that when the remuneration of the supervisory board
increases, the performance of the hospital, in terms of cost
efficiency, gets worse. This implies that remuneration of the
supervisory board is not a sufficient condition for a
professional supervisory board that is able to guard the
performance of the hospital.
External members in the board, in most cases interim
management, leads to significant estimates with a positive
sign under VRS. A plausible hypothesis is that interim
management has a knowledge gap about the hospital, which
may result in lower performance. However, caution is
required in interpreting this result, since interim manage-
ment may also reflect serious organizational problems. In
that case causality between interim management and
efficiency should be reversed. More details, for instance
about the point of time the interim manager joined the
hospital or about temporarily filling-in of a regular vacancy,
may shed some light on this.
The variable statutory changes is only significant under
VRS and it is only the case when we are less restrictive with
our confidence interval. The sign is negative meaning that a
statutory change is correlated with a more efficient score.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of the corporate gover-
nance structure of hospitals on cost efficiency using the
method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with a
bootstrapping procedure. We use the DEA measure of
cost-efficiency on the hospital level. Our focus then turns to
explaining variations in cost inefficiency which is due to a
hospital’s corporate governance.
A popular way to conduct such analysis has been a Tobit
analysis wherein the efficiency score is regressed on a
variety of variables thought to affect efficiency. However,
in this second stage, DEA-scores are derived relative to a
best practice frontier which does not have an associated
error term. Without this error term, it is possible that bias
may arise leading to measurement error in the dependent
variable problem i.e., biased and inconsistent estimates.
Simar and Wilson [28] suggest using a bootstrapping
procedure in order to obtain consistent estimates.
Following this suggestion, we proceed to an analysis of a
sample of Dutch hospitals using several steps. In the first
stage, DEA results indicate, that on average, cost efficiency
for general hospitals is 1.28 under the CRS assumption and
1.12 under the VRS assumption. The second stage shows
that the cost efficiency scores can be explained by variables
that measure aspects of the corporate governance of
hospitals. Whether the explanatory variables are significant
depends on the assumption on the returns to scale.
Especially under CRS there are some governance variables,
i.e. the size of the board, that are correlated with the scale
and therefore also explain scale effects. Under VRS scale
effects are of course absorbed.
Developments in health care policy in the last two
decades in western countries have a tendency towards
deregulation. As a result management and control of the
health care provider has changed. Justification, transparency
Table 4 Lower and upper bound for 95% confidence intervals for the parameter estimates
CRS VRS
Median Lower bound
(α=2.5%)
Upper bound
(α=97.5%)
Median Lower bound
(α=2.5%)
Upper bound
(α=97.5%)
Constant 1.185 0.933 1.282 1.099 1.041 1.296
Dummy, size of the board = 2 0.020 −0.064 0.103 −0.039 −0.103 0.018
Dummy, size of the board >3 0.141 0.0001 0.247 −0.032 −0.131 0.037
Remuneration chairperson of the board 0.145 0.044 0.253 0.089 −0.010 0.144
Remuneration chairperson supervisory board 0.095 0.013 0.183 0.052 0.001 0.124
Dummy, external contract (int. man.) −0.019 −0.060 0.146 0.040 0.010 0.162
Dummy, statutory changes −0.014 −0.108 0.042 −0.005 −0.103 0.001
Sigma 0.151 0.127 0.175 0.110 0.088 0.122
Bold: significant at the 5% level
CRS VRS
Mean 1.28 1.12
Std deviation 0.21 0.13
Minimum 1.00 1.00
Maximum 2.12 1.82
95% percentile 1.67 1.34
Table 3 DEA result, statistics
for the Reciprocal of the Cost
efficiency under CRS and VRS
998 J Med Syst (2011) 35:991–999and good governance are import elements in the deregulated
environment. It is therefore surprising that in productivity
analysis not too much attention has been paid to the relation
between corporate governance and cost efficiency. This
paper investigates this relation for the Dutch hospital
industry and contributes in the discussion over good
governance. It is important to note that not all differences
in cost efficiency are a result of governance. However, the
board and the supervisory board call the shots in an
organization, quality of governance will therefore have an
impact on the performance. This paper shows that the
relation between governance and cost efficiency exists and
how they relate. From the viewpoint of the policymaker it is
therefore important to keep on monitoring the governance,
keep searching for best practices and stimulate governance
structures that lead to better performance.
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